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Introduction
In his important work The Literary Work of Art Roman Ingarden 
investigates the borderlines between ontology, logic, philosophy 
of language, linguistics, and aesthetics. Among other things Ingar-
den presents a theory about how language presents a schematiza-
tion of the perceptual experience. He tries to demonstrate how the 
structures of our perceptual experience are mapped onto language. 
This does not mean that certain linguistic structures correspond to 
structures of things in the world, but rather that they correspond 
to the experiential structures of perception of things in the world. 
The meaning of a sentence can somehow present a schematiza-
tion of the profi les through which we perceive a thing or situation. 
In this paper I will focus on these schematized profi les.
As is well known, Ingarden operates with a theory of language 
that involves not only the traditional ideas of sound, meaning, and 
referent. He has a richer and more stratifi ed conception. Accord-
ing to Ingarden, any meaningful linguistic expression contains 
not only an expression-form and a semantic content, but through 
the derived intentionality of this content also a corresponding 
purely intentional referent, and depending on the type of purely 
intentional referent a connected set of schematized profi les of 
the referent in question. Now, the conception that language itself 
constitutes a triad of sound, meaning, and some kind of “immedi-
ate” object, dependent on the linguistic meaning, is familiar to 
some semiotic theories of language (even though Ingarden’s in-
tentional way of describing this triad may not be), but Ingarden’s 
theory about the schematized profi les seems to me to be a genu-
ine phenomenological innovation.
For reasons I will return to, it is extremely diffi cult to describe 
this fourth component in the semiotics of language and conse-
quently to explain Ingarden’s theory. Ingarden’s conception of 
the linguistic expression as containing a fourth stratum of sche-
matized profi les has consequently been considered very contro-
versial in theories of literature dealing explicitly with Ingarden. 
On the one hand we can think of Wellek’s straightforward denial 
of any such fourth stratum and on the other hand of Iser’s criti-
cal embracement of the idea of schematized profi les as a bridge 
between the text and the reader experience. In the philosophy of 
language, the semiotics of language, as well as in linguistics there 
seems to have been an almost absolute ignorance of Ingarden’s 
theory of language, and especially of the schematized profi les. 
But something is happening now. Recent developments in cogni-
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tive linguistics and semiotics are pointing in the same direction 
as Ingarden did, and with these new results it will probably be-
come easier to understand what Ingarden meant and to explain 
his theory.
Profi les and the appearance of an object
As many other phenomenologists, Ingarden considers it as very 
important to account for the manifesting or presenting qualities 
of language, by which I mean the fact that we experience lan-
guage as being able to show or present what is actually absent. 
As language users we are somehow able to spotlight the things 
we are talking about and make them manifest to our listeners, 
even when the real objects themselves are actually absent. Ingar-
den wants to account for this experience that specifi c types of 
propositions are able to make a display of the purely intentional 
things or situations, to which the propositions refer. His way into 
this problem is the insight that to be perceptually present is to be 
present from a certain perspective and correlatively to be present 
through a certain profi le (Ansicht). Consequently, his main thesis 
is that if the propositions are to make a display of their purely in-
tentional referents, then the propositions must contain a means 
to specify the sets of profi les necessary for perceptual presenta-
tion of the referents in question.
Ingarden explicitly puts aside the general question of which 
types of objects it is possible through linguistic means to display 
and thus to make ready for a perceptual apprehension by the 
interlocutor (Ingarden 1931, 271). He considers it a historical 
fact that we frequently experience this type of perceptual ap-
prehension when reading or hearing about real things and situ-
ations. Therefore he focuses his discussion on propositions that 
have referents of the type real. Thus, his premise is that if such 
a purely intentional referent is to be prepared for a perceptual 
apprehension, then it has to conform to the structures of sensory 
perception and the structures of the perceptual appearance of a 
real thing. If the text, in other words, is to give the reader an im-
pression of “seeing” (in the imagination) the referred-to objects, 
then it must somehow instantiate a structure that is relevantly 
similar to the structure of our perceptual experience.
Let me therefore sketch what Ingarden describes as the main 
features of this perceptual appearance of the real thing. I will use 
a favourite example of Husserl and Ingarden: A red ball. Looking 
at a red ball in a static position, I can change my attentional focus 
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from the ball to the perceptual experience of the ball. Moving 
my head slightly from side to side, I can become aware of the 
fact that my perceptual experience of the red ball is constituted 
by a series of “red ball-profi les”. Strictly speaking, at a given time 
and from a given visual perspective, I have only a sensory experi-
ence of a given profi le of the ball. But nevertheless, normally I do 
experience the thing I see as a red ball and not as a profi le. This 
leads to some of the conceptual problems involved in describing 
the perceptual experience. The main diffi culty is the status of 
these profi les. Normally I do not pay any attention to the profi les, 
regardless of their constitutive importance for the appearance of 
the thing in question. They do not form the thematic focus of my 
perception but constitute that through which a thing appears to 
me. I see immediately – if not focused otherwise – a red ball, and 
although this ball can only appear to me as a red ball through its 
profi les, the strange thing is that if I focus my attention directly 
on the profi les themselves, then the object – the red ball – seems 
somehow to disappear.
So, the profi les have a peculiar experiential status. The red ball 
can only appear through a profi le, most likely as a red disk. But this 
red disk-profi le is not the ball itself. A ball is round and the profi le 
is rather a fl at, red disk. The ball has the same red colour all over 
and the disk-profi le is rather a continuous overlapping of nuances 
of red. A ball can roll in all directions, a red disk cannot. Further, 
I experience the profi les as depending on me. I can at will change 
the fl ow of profi les, but not the ball itself – it continues to appear 
as itself through these willed variations. Still, this does not mean 
that I experience the profi les as a sole function of my will and as 
absolutely dependent on me. The profi les occur always as embedd-
ed in a stream of profi les and are dependent on this stream. This 
means that if in a stream of red disk-profi les I suddenly experience 
a blue disk-profi le or even a red square-profi le, then these two oc-
currences would not have the same experiential meaning, as if they 
had occurred respectively in a stream of blue disk-profi les and in a 
stream of red square-profi les. This indicates that I can only control 
the profi les within certain limits, in the sense that I can e.g. never 
make a ball appear in a rectangular profi le. So, on the one hand 
the profi les are not objectifi ed, they are not experienced as things, 
and on the other hand they are not subjective, being experienced 
as I-external, as not entirely depending on me.
Although there is a clear difference between an object and its 
profi les there seems to be certain regular or even law governed 
relations between them. Take for instances the continuous fl ow of 
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profi les through which I perceive a red ball. Here it counts as a law 
of experience that as long as I perceive a ball there will be no angle 
from which the ball will be appearing in a rectangular profi le, and 
consequently appears as say a book. This goes for any objective 
space-forms. They are all in a law governed way bound to specifi c 
sets of profi les through which they can appear. This means that 
an invariant structure of profi les manifests itself by the fl ow of 
ever changing profi les. Two profi les, occurring in the same fl ow, 
are never identical with respect to their qualitative content, but 
they do nevertheless manifest the same inherent structure, which 
can make the same object appear through both of them. Thus, the 
appearance of the object concerned is not altered by every differ-
ence in the qualitative content of the profi les or in the way they 
are experienced. So, when I perceive a red ball it can at a given 
time t
1
 be said to appear to me in the form of red disk-profi le with 
a determinate continuous distribution of red nuances and at time 
t
2
 to have the same form but necessarily with a slightly different 
distribution of red nuances. This makes it clear that there exist no 
law governed relation between a given perceptual appearance of 
an object or its properties and a specifi c, concrete experienced pro-
fi le. Rather the law governed relation is between a given percep-
tual appearance of an object or its properties and a specifi c plurali-
ty of profi les, all manifesting the same invariant structure through 
which the object or property in question can appear. Or articu-
lated the other way around: If we experience a specifi c plurality 
of profi les, then a certain object will appear. In other words, every 
perceptually appearing object or objective property is a priori cor-
related with a general schema of profi les (or sets of schemes). In 
this way every object or objective property determines a plurality 
of schematized profi les. So, Ingarden understands the following 
by the concept of the schematized profi les: The totality of the mo-
ments of a concrete profi le’s content, the presence of which con-
stitutes the suffi cient and necessary condition for the appearance 
of the objective property in question (ibid. 279). Schematized pro-
fi les described in this way are not experienced concretely, because 
if that were the case we would not be dealing with a schema for 
profi les, but with a concrete profi le itself.
Linguistic schematization of objective appearance
Ingarden applies this concept of schematized profi les in his de-
scription of the manifesting or presenting qualities of language. 
If a linguistic expression refers to an object of the type real, that 
NET 32 2005 Text.indd   40 06-03-17   14.53.41
41r.  ingarden’s  theory of schematized profiles
is, to an object that can be perceived, then the object must be 
correlated with a plurality of schematized profi les correspond-
ing to its objective space-form. These sets of schematized pro-
fi les are not to be regarded as a part of the reader’s background 
knowledge and as something the reader makes use of in case he 
is to fantasize what he reads. Rather they are part of the semantic 
content, that is to say a part of the inferential web, which the text 
spins. Take as an example this small text: “The red ball was lying 
on the table. From where Husserl stood he could see something 
rectangular on the table.” It is clearly the case that the two objects 
on the table, referred to in the two sentences, could not be the 
same, and that is exactly because they have incommensurable 
schematized profi les. In a case like this, it has nothing to do with 
whether the reader imagines the objects or not. The schematized 
profi les are not associated with the referred-to objects because of 
the reader, but are present in the text depending on the types of 
objects referred to.
One can perhaps say that the core of any linguistic understand-
ing is the grasping of the semantic content that has been given 
an expression. Such an understanding can be described as the 
rethinking by the understanding subject of the thought that has 
been given an expression. This core experience of understanding 
must not be understood as the various possible ways of imagin-
ing that can and often does accompany such an understanding. 
“The World Trade Center was attacked”. Some people will form 
mental images on hearing or reading this sentence, others will 
not. But in both cases, people will understand it. So “the possible 
imagistic or otherwise sensory-experience-like accompaniments 
of understanding” (Strawson 1994, p. 8) seems to be completely 
facultative. But nevertheless, often the imagination does play 
a big role in the reader’s or hearer’s experience of a text. There 
seem to be certain aesthetic contexts in which the understanding 
of the text (e.g. a narrative) involves a grasp of the possibility or 
impossibility of sensory-based imaginings. In this way it appears 
that an adequate understanding of Robbe-Grillet’s La Jalousi in-
volves a grasp of the near impossibility of imagining the visual 
referent-situations of the long, detailed descriptions of the novel. 
And similarly, certain texts seem to demand of their reader that 
the reader understands and feels the presence and in actu evolve-
ment of certain actions and happenings. In such cases the linguis-
tic expression can have such a strong manifesting quality that we 
almost experience to “see” what we read.
It seems that a proper understanding of a sentence in some 
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cases not only forces us to think in a certain way, but sometimes 
also to imagine in a certain way. In this case, we could perhaps 
speak of the imaginative comprehension as quasi-obligatory, in 
the sense that an adequate grasp of the structure and function 
of the specifi c text demands that the understanding subject con-
cretises the text in certain imaginings (or at least that he recog-
nises that the text points toward such imaginings). This in no 
way exclude that the reader could always refrain from forming 
such imaginings and focus only on the linguistic understanding. 
It seems therefore necessary to differentiate between two types 
of imaginative involvement with the purely intentional objects 
referred to by the text.
(1) By help of the text sequence we can reconstruct the appea-
rance of the described thing or situation, and step by step 
form an imagination of it.
(2) In reading the text sequence we are prompted to form 
what seems to be a spontaneous perceptual imagination of 
the linguistically presented thing or situation.
This goes to indicate that a text in varied degrees can specify the 
schematized profi les involved. Ingarden’s idea seems to be that
(a) in the simple mentioning of an object the correlated sche-
matized profi les will have only a pure potential status.
(b) In a further step the potential profi les can be linguistically 
specifi ed so as to prepare for a specifi c type of appearance, 
and
(c) in a fi nal step they can be specifi ed so as to function as a 
“display-making”. If this is the case we tend to form a vivid 
perceptual imagination of what the text presents.
So, according to Ingarden, for the linguistically referred-to ob-
jects to achieve a perceptual manifestation and for the reading or 
listening subject to have a concrete experience of perceiving (in 
the imagination) the objects in question, there must on the one 
hand be certain specifying linguistic factors in the text and on 
the other hand certain actualizing and concretizing operations 
performed by the subject. The correlated schematized profi les 
thus may be specifi ed in such a way that they are present not as 
purely potential but rather as “prepared-for-appearing” or “made 
ready for display”. But granted this, it implicates that it will never 
be possible solely by linguistic means to specify the profi les to 
such an extent that the object will appear as real and physically 
present. It is only possible within certain limits to control lin-
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guistically this fi nal specifi cation performed by the reader. This 
linguistic “control” can be performed in two different ways: (1) 
By phonemic and prosodic factors of the text or (2) by semantic 
factors of the text. I will focus on the semantic factors.
Ingarden claims that the propositional content can and often 
will specify the schematized profi les through which the referent 
appears. There is no easy way to describe exactly how this speci-
fi cation is being performed. According to my earlier account the 
profi les are neither objective nor subjective. They are not the ob-
ject of our perception, but that through which we perceive the 
objects, that through which they appear. This ambigous, in-be-
tween status of the profi les must be considered and accounted for 
in the understanding of how language specifi es the schematized 
profi les. If the specifi cations are to succeed, the profi les cannot 
be the theme of the sentences. This would transform the profi le 
from being the medium by which an object appears to becoming 
itself an object, often with the consequent that nothing seems to 
appear. This means that if the schematized profi les are meant to 
function as “display-makers”, then the specifi cation of the profi les 
cannot be achieved by an explicit mentioning or description of 
a specifi c type of profi le. So the specifi cation of profi les has in a 
certain sense to be implicit. The schematized profi les cannot be 
the intentional referent of the expression, but must be the result 
of the way this intentionality functions. Let us now take a closer 
and more concrete look on how this propositional intentionality 
can function.
Ingarden’s static framework
Ingarden’s answer to how this intentionality can function in 
a specifying way seems to follow directly from his theoretical 
framework, i.e. the phenomenological description of the percep-
tual experience or correlatively of the perceptual appearance of 
objects. He therefore suggests that the primary way to specify the 
schematized profi les is by a specifi cation of how the intended 
object looks. This happens, according to Ingarden, by the type of 
sentence which unfolds the looks of an object. “Soaussehensver-
halte”, Ingarden calls the referents of such sentences. The more 
the text specifi es the important structures of the perceptual situ-
ation, the more it is supposed to prepare the described situation 
for a perceptual appearance. So in addition to describing visual 
qualities of the intended objects, it also has to indicate the per-
spective from where the objects are supposed to be perceived 
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and further the spatial relations between the objects themselves 
and between the objects and the point of view. This text sequence 
from Portrait of the Artist may serve as a good example of such a 
specifi cation:
The director stood in the embrasure of the window, his back to the light, 
leaning an elbow on the brown crossblind, and, as he spoke and smiled, 
slowly dangling and looping the cord of the other blind. Stephen stood 
before him, followed for a moment with his eyes the waning of the long 
summer daylight above the roofs or the slow deft movements of the 
priestly fi ngers. The priest’s face was in total shadow, but the waning 
daylight from behind him touched the deeply grooved temples and the 
curves of the skull. (p. 154)
This example from James Joyce clearly demonstrates that indica-
tions of all the relevant features of the perceptual situation pre-
pare the described scene for a visualization of it. On the basis of 
such a description the reader can reconstruct a perceptual experi-
ence of the scene in the imagination. But the example also dem-
onstrates that such a reconstruction takes some labour, and it can 
at times be a tedious undertaking (readers of Robbe-Grillet will 
grant me that). It seems to have little in common with the experi-
ence Ingarden refers to, when he says that the text forces one to 
imagine what one reads – the almost spontaneous experience of 
being witness to the scene as it evolves in actu. An experience he 
describes as being one of presence and not one of distance (In-
garden 1968, pp. 130ff.). But an experience that involves a great 
deal of imaginative activity and concentration is not likely to be 
experienced with the kind of effortlessness that characterizes our 
perceptions. This kind of descriptions does of course specify the 
relevant features of the perceptual situation and therewith pre-
pares it for perceptual apprehension, for a “visualizing reading”, 
but it does not function so as to make a display of the referent-
situation. What is missing?
The dynamic version
Ingarden seems to focus on the linguistic description of the per-
ceptual characteristics of the referent-situation as a consequent 
of his primary interest in the static perceptual experience, the 
scrutinizing vision. For several reasons this choice may be an un-
happy one. First of all, as many other phenomenologists have 
pointed to, this picture of the perception as a scrutinizing atten-
tive perception might only be a limit situation and have only little 
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in common with the normal pragmatic function of perception, 
which does not focus on the perceptual qualities of the object, but 
rather on its practical aspects. Accordingly, we do not primarily 
see a chair as a brown and blue thing, but as something to be sat 
on. Second, as the example shows, the linguistic description of 
perceptual qualities may give instructions as to how the referent-
situation should be visualized, but does not prompt the reader to 
visualize the scene without making a willed effort to do so.
But there are other ways of specifying the schematized pro-
fi les of the referent-situation. Ways that Ingarden seems to have 
overlooked, due to his theoretical framework, and that appear to 
be true to the experience he describes. Let me try to show this by 
way of a textual example:
When Camilla had entered her room, she pulled up the blind, leaned her 
brow against the cool pane, and hummed Elisabeth’s song from “The 
Fairy-hill”. At sunset a light breeze had begun to blow and a few tiny, 
white clouds, illuminated by the moon, were driven towards Camilla. 
For a long while she stood regarding them; she followed them from a far 
distance, and she sang louder and louder as they drew nearer, kept silent 
a few seconds while they disappeared above her, then sought others, 
and followed them too. With a little sigh she pulled down the blind. She 
walked to the dressing table, leaned her elbows against it, rested her head 
in her clasped hands and regarded her own picture in the mirror without 
really seeing it. (p. 29–30)
This sequence, taken from J.P. Jacobsen’s short story Mogens, 
presents us with a different type of situation; one that more easi-
ly makes us visualize what is going on. Comparing the two differ-
ent text sequences one immediately senses the dynamic nature of 
the latter contrasted with the more static character of the former. 
This seems to indicate that the more immediate perceptual ap-
prehension of the latter text sequence has something to do with 
the dynamic way in which it specifi es the schematized profi les.
Ingarden himself gives some indications of how to describe 
the way these more dynamic action sentences succeed in specify-
ing the schematized profi les, so as to prompt the reader to visual-
ize the referent-situation. He differentiates between four types of 
sentences on the basis of what types of referent-situations they 
project. For example, he contrasts sentences with referent-situa-
tions that involve a dynamic doing or happening with those that 
involve static relations (e.g. between an object and a property). 
The fi rst type is described as unfolding a dynamic activity in actu; 
the second as relating one object to another in a static and dis-
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tanced way. But he seems to leave it at that and does not take it 
further in the chapters on schematized profi les.
Let me try to describe how I understand the action sentences 
in the last text sequence as being capable of specifying the sche-
matized profi les in a manner that is true to life, that is, analogue 
to the way the perception functions in our pragmatic real life 
experiences. Take the sentence “With a little sigh she pulled down 
the blind”.  This action sentence presents us with an active body, 
with the unfolding of a bodily action. So, by the use of the so-
called basic action-verbs, such as running, lifting, jumping, crawl-
ing, climping, we are presented with a specifi c bodily function 
and experience that is not the semantic focus of the sentence. 
The semantic focus of the sentence is rather the agent and her 
goal, e.g. in the sentence “She walked to her dressing-table”. A ba-
sic action-sentence like this explicitly mentions a specifi c bodily 
function, but focuses on the agent’s goal, on her getting to the 
dressing-table. This sentence in a single and unifi ed manner ex-
presses the agent’s intention (her wanting or intending to get to 
the dressing-table), her bodily motion (walking), and her percep-
t ual focus (most likely directed toward the dressing-table).  The 
sentence expresses the experience of a non-objectifi ed body in 
action; a unifi ed experience of the moving body and its immedi-
ate surroundings as a whole. Our direct and unmediated intimate 
“knowledge” with this type of basic bodily motion, as well as our 
knowledge of where the agent directs her attention gives us an 
awareness of the situation as a whole. So, we have here a direct 
but non-thematic acquaintance with the structures of the situa-
tion, and these structures are of an experiential embodied type. 
We immediately sense what it would be like to be in the same 
situation.
If we compare these considerations with cognitive linguistic 
insights of e.g. Leonard Talmy about the attentional structures in 
language we obtain a way of understanding how action sentences 
dynamically can specify schematized profi les of the referent-situ-
ation. The action sentences involve the lived bodily experiences 
of the agent. This gives us an immediate understanding of the 
situation as a whole. We know the fundamental structures of the 
situation and we experience it as a whole in time and space. This 
makes it possible for us to focus our attention on specifi c parts, 
while letting other parts slide into the background. Linguistically 
speaking, this means that sentences that mention only some 
parts of the referent-situation, while leaving other parts out, for 
a full comprehension still demands that we are aware of the situ-
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ation as a whole. The explicit mentioning of specifi c parts of the 
referent-situation implies or entails the structure of the situation 
as a whole. But at the same time the explicit mentioning of spe-
cifi c parts gives a perspective on the situation in which only the 
mentioned parts are put in the foreground (“windowed”). So, in 
the action sentences we do not need to mention more than a few 
aspects of the situation in order to bring the situation as a whole 
into play. Through these action sentences we are presented with 
a dynamic situation as a whole and with the attentional focus 
directed at specifi c aspects (most often the goal or result of the 
action).
One could work a lot more on this way of describing the mani-
festing or presenting qualities of the action sentences, so as to ac-
count in more detail for how the perspective is placed within the 
situation. But that will be beyond the scope of this paper.
To conclude: Ingarden gives a very interesting phenomenologi-
cal description of how language can manifest the actually absent. 
To do this the language must somehow be able to specify from 
what perspective the referent appears. That is, it must somehow 
be able to specify the schematized profi les of the referent. This 
specifi cation cannot be performed by an explicit reference to 
a schematized profi le, because this would seriously distort the 
function of the profi les as that, which we non-thematically “live 
through” and through which the objects are appearing. So, this 
specifi cation must somehow take place implicitly. I have tried 
to point out that this specifi cation most fully takes place by the 
dynamic structures of the action sentences. I think these are in-
sights that should be more fully appreciated in the semiotics and 
aesthetics of language.
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